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Executive Summary 
 
 
 Special purpose entities, or Public Authorities, constitute a substantial portion of 
the public sector.  In Kentucky, these entities provide large percentages of the services 
offered by state and local governments, employ thousands, have immense budgets, and 
issue large quantities of debt.  It is this debt issuance that may be of concern to public 
administrators.  
 The purpose of this study was to examine the numbers and types of Authorities 
operating in a selection of Kentucky municipalities and how these Authorities, combined 
with other possible determinants, affect the levels of aggregate debt in the jurisdictions. 
A combination of analytical methods demonstrated that while some of the proposed 
determinants, such as tax revenue and population density, did appear to affect the levels 
of aggregate debt, the presence of autonomous Public Authorities was seemingly 
inconsequential.  According to this study, autonomous Public Authorities do not affect 
the levels of aggregate debt in Kentucky's cities. Finally, the study demonstrates that the 
lack of transparency of information regarding these public entities operating in 
Kentucky's cities may be a cause for concern.   
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Municipal governments throughout Kentucky, like states and cities across the 
country, have turned increasingly to the use of special purpose entities, or Public 
Authorities, to finance and administer public projects and services.  There is considerable 
debate among scholars, administrators, and officers regarding the true purpose of special 
purpose entities.  Some argue that they are often better suited for specific purposes than is 
the traditional model of government.  Others argue that they are simply vehicles for debt.  
A case can be made for either point of view. 
Though the nature and even the identities of special purpose entities in the public 
sector can be ambiguous, one thing is certain.  They do, in general, issue debt and often 
do so in very large amounts.  Even though the statutory obligation of debt is shifted from 
the government to the Authority in such cases, financial mismanagement of and, 
particularly, excessive debt issuance by Authorities can be costly and damaging to the 
creator government.   
It is difficult to measure how much debt is too much, particularly when dealing 
with Authorities that, while legally separate, are inextricably linked to their parent 
governments.  Currently, Kentucky's municipalities have Authorities operating within 
their boundaries and often have little control over the debt issuance of those entities.  The 
Authorities are granted varying degrees of freedom in their own financial affairs and it is 
difficult to predict the long-term affects this may have on the individual governments.  
Moreover, there is very little transparency regarding the financial activities of 
Authorities, as they do not always have to report budgets or have debt issues approved by 
the creator governments.  The public is generally not familiar with the activities of 
Authorities and, sometimes, the parent government has little knowledge of or control 
over the financial affairs of the entities.  The result is that Authorities operate in a realm 
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largely obscured form our vision but have the capacity to severely affect the financial 
position of local governments. 
To understand the effects that the financial activities of Public Authorities may 
have on their creators, it is useful to first look to the relationship between Authorities and 
the aggregate debt of a municipality.  If Authorities are issuing large or excessive 
amounts of debt in Kentucky's communities, as some have argued they are prone to do, 
we would expect to see larger quantities of aggregate debt in municipalities with more 
loosely controlled Authorities.  If this is the case, that Authorities or the lack of control 
over Authorities is associated with increased aggregate debt, there is cause for concern. 
The purpose of this study is to identify and categorize the special purpose entities 
operating in a selection of Kentucky cities and determine if they or a combination of 
other factors are influencing the debt issuance in the jurisdiction.  If there seems to be no 
association between Authorities and high debt, there is little cause for concern and 
municipalities should feel safe in the continued use of Authorities as service providers 
and financial vehicles.  If, however, we find that there is some relationship between the 
use of Authorities, particularly with regard to their autonomy, and increased levels of 
aggregate debt, we must then more closely examine the safe use of special purpose 
entities.   
The following study is a background of Public Authorities in the United States, an 
examination of the numbers and natures of Authorities in Kentucky cities, and an 
evaluation of Authorities in conjunction with other factors as determinants of aggregate 
debt. 
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Background 
Since the creation of the Port Authority of New York in 1921, Public Authorities 
have emerged as increasingly large and important components of state and local 
governments. These entities, often identified as special districts, public corporations, 
special purpose entities, or public authorities, have grown at an impressive rate in the less 
than one century since they appeared in American government. The growth of Public 
Authorities has vastly outpaced the growth of their state and local parent governments in 
terms of number of entities, personnel, and budgets. (Eger, 2000)  Along with this 
measurable expansion in size has come a quite accelerated rate of debt issuance. Public 
Authorities, by whatever names they may be identified, have for some time outpaced the 
debt financing of their parent governments in terms of number of issues, frequency of 
issues, and total debt outstanding. (Mitchell, 1996)  Quite simply, the number and size of 
tax-exempt securities issued by Public Authorities is growing far faster than those of 
traditional state and local government entities.  
As Public Authorities increase in size and number the general question is begged, 
is this a safe, practical, and acceptable alternative to the provision of public goods 
through traditional forms of government? A strong case can be made for the use of Public 
Authorities on the grounds that their focused mission and assumed expertise, along with 
their independent financial characteristics make them ideal for certain purposes. We may 
concede that in many instances the special nature of Authorities make them excellent 
purveyors of public goods and that, in addition, their independent financial structures 
make them easier to monitor and evaluate than traditional governmental organizations. 
Moreover, they certainly allow governments to undertake desirable projects that might 
not otherwise be feasible due to financial, statutory, or constitutional constraints. 
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However, the latter of these two advantages of Public Authorities might also be viewed 
as a potential drawback.  
Across the United States, it is difficult to predict the effects of the financial 
activities of Public Authorities on their parent governments and constituents. There have 
been a few instances in which the license of special purpose entities to issue debt has 
resulted in over-extension and, sometimes, default or financial collapse. In such cases, the 
creator governments are inevitably left to pick up the pieces. There are a number of 
forces that could act to create such a situation, from internal mismanagement to outside 
influences.  
It is important then, that governments create these special purpose entities with 
this in mind and make every attempt to ensure the stability and success of the entity. 
There are a number of steps governments can take to try to promote the financial 
responsibility of Public Authorities and they are usually established with the Authority's 
creation. (Leigland, 1994)  Even though Authorities exist independently, their creators 
often impose restrictions and checks from their inceptions. Their activities can be subject 
to executive review or veto, legislative approval, or any other controls the creator 
governments wish to embed. There are no set guidelines for establishing these controls 
and governments have proved to be diverse and creative in their establishing of special 
purpose entities, with a variety of structures and widely ranging levels of autonomy.  
In light of the variety of structures and degrees of autonomy found in Public 
Authorities, scholars have devoted considerable effort to characterizing and categorizing 
these entities as well as assessing their effectiveness in carrying out their stated 
objectives. Through these efforts, we have come to better understand the complex nature 
and existence of the many types of special purpose entities operating in the United States. 
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 However, it remains difficult to predict whether the financial activities of 
Authorities will have any negative effects on their creator governments. The independent 
status of special purpose entities certainly shifts the statutory financial obligation off the 
creator government. It is not difficult, however, to understand the responsibility that still 
remains with the parent government even after the responsibility has been legally shifted 
to the Authority. In fact, one of the most common concerns expressed by interviewees in 
the course of this study was that, while the there is sometimes no statutory obligation on 
the part of the creator government for the debt incurred by special purpose entities, 
implicit obligations remain and are quite real. Implicit obligations, refers to the 
understanding that, in the event of the failure of special purpose entity, the parent 
government will be responsible in the eyes of the public to restore stability and an 
acceptable level of service.  
Herein is the potential problem with Public Authorities. They are created to be 
separate entities in many ways and, most importantly, are legally separate financial 
entities. However, they remain inextricably linked to their creator governments. This 
poses a potential problem when governments create Authorities that are autonomous to 
varying degrees. Governments often create special purpose entities with the authority to 
issue debt. While this debt is many times not the statutory obligation of the parent 
government, the government will bear the burden in numerous ways if the Authority 
should default or collapse. The government will be forced to endure public outrage while 
attempting to devise an alternative source of providing whatever good was the mission of 
the failed Authority. This is the implicit obligation of the creator government. 
The prominent cities of Kentucky are certainly representative of this scenario. 
Each of the Commonwealth's major cities has within it entities that can accurately be 
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described as Public Authorities. Each city has created each of these entities with a 
different structure and degree of autonomy. Authorities across Kentucky are, as 
elsewhere, responsible for a range of public services and goods and comprise a 
substantial portion of the public sector. As Kentucky's major cities are in a similar 
position with regard to special purpose entities as the rest of the nation, similar potential 
problems loom. While the special purpose entities are legally separate, their financial 
activities could possibly have a negative impact on the municipal governments.  
It is difficult to measure the potential for harm posed by special purpose entities 
and there are a number of ways one might approach this problem. One option is to 
examine the relationship between special purpose entities and the aggregate debt, or the 
sum of public entity-held debt in a jurisdiction. By first establishing the characteristics 
and levels of autonomy of special purpose entities in each city, then attempting to 
determine if this autonomy has any correlation with abnormal or accelerated debt 
issuance, we might determine how Public Authorities are and may continue to affect the 
financial positions of creator governments. Currently, it is difficult to tell if Kentucky's 
major cities have created Public Authorities whose operations may have adverse effects 
on their creator governments. By realizing the nature of these Authorities and their levels 
of financial autonomy, as well as any effects of these entities on increased aggregate debt, 
we might better understand whether Kentucky's Public Authorities are acting in manners 
that might negatively affect their parent governments. 
Discussion of Terminology and Definitions 
Aggregate Debt 
Aggregate debt is the sum of all public debt in a given jurisdiction.  This is an 
important but often overlooked figure that provides some insight into the overall position 
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of public entities in a city or region.  When examining the financial positions of local 
governments, we typically focus only on the debt issued and held by the traditional 
government itself.  The outstanding debt of a local government, as reported in 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Statements or other such documents, generally consists 
only of the debt for which that entity is directly obligated.  This often includes GO debt, 
revenue bonds and other direct issues, as well as the issues of entities listed as component 
units.  This figure is useful in understanding the financial position of the entity but it is 
usually only a small fraction of the aggregate public debt in a jurisdiction.  
Defining and Characterizing Public Authorities 
Public Authorities, used interchangeably with special purpose entities in this work 
as an umbrella term to describe a number of categories of public entities whose 
characteristics will be discussed hereinafter, possess a number of general traits that make 
them attractive alternatives to traditional governmental agencies. First, Authorities are 
often created with the assumption that their independent status, in that they are legally 
separate from their parent governments, will insulate them from the political concerns 
that sometimes interfere with optimal policy in traditional governmental entities. In other 
words, the creators of Public Authorities often hope that the legal separation of the 
entities from the government and its political affiliates will allow the Authorities to act 
solely in pursuit of their stated objectives.  
Second, in addition to the insulation from political concerns, Public Authorities 
are often created to take advantage of the presumed benefits of governance by a single or 
narrowed purpose entity. The hope is that, in addition to minimizing the influence of 
politics, Authorities may minimize the influence of competing policy objectives. In 
traditional governmental organizations, the variety of objectives commonly place projects 
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and initiatives in competition for time, attention, and funding. This is not so prevalent an 
issue within single or narrow purpose Authorities. They are usually designed with a 
single or a narrow set of objectives in mind, and thus, they are not generally subject to the 
policy rivalry associated with traditional governments.  
Another potential benefit derived from the creation of a special purpose Authority 
is the level of expertise that may arise from its specified objectives. The assumption is 
that, given its narrow interests, a Public Authority will develop a level of specialization 
and expertise within its ranks largely foreign to traditional state and local agencies or 
divisions.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Public Authorities are created as vehicles 
for funding. Notional and statutory limitations, both externally and internally imposed, 
limit the debt financing activities of state and local governments. Whether in the form of 
state imposed limitations on municipalities, self imposed ceilings, or a perceived lack of 
approval from constituents, there are myriad regulating forces affecting the debt 
financing of state and municipal governments. Whether the ceilings are definite, such as a 
dollar amount or percentage, or notional, vague, or otherwise non-specific, their effects 
are noticeable. When traditional governments wish to avoid the direct burden of 
additional debt financing or skirt internally or externally imposed restrictions, they 
commonly turn to the creation of Public Authorities. Using Authorities as financing 
vehicles may allow governments to fund necessary or desirable projects without incurring 
the direct, legal obligation of additional debt. The popularity of these independent entities 
has grown substantially since the creation of the Port Authority of New York and Public 
Authorities have emerged as a large and rapidly expanding facet of state and local 
government. 
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Several scholars have devoted their time to the study of special purpose public 
entities and most have found that one of the most glaring difficulties inherent in the 
endeavor is that of identification and classification. A section devoted to relevant and 
important research in the field will follow. First, however, it is necessary to briefly 
discuss the terminology and categorization used herein. As mentioned earlier, the term 
Public Authority will be used liberally in this analysis as an umbrella term to describe 
entities that are created by governments to serve public interests, but which maintain a 
legally separate status. Borrowing from the work of Robert Eger, discussed in more detail 
later, Public Authorities can be divided into the subcategories special districts, 
government corporations, and public authorities. Again, Eger's contribution to the study 
of these entities will be discussed later but, for now, it is sufficient to mention that the 
proper term Public Authority (capitalized) is divisible into the aforementioned sub-
categories. This is the basic categorization used in this analysis and is illustrated in 
Appendix A.  Such entities are government creatures and are similar to the government in 
their purposes. However, they are separated by varying degrees from their creators.  
Typically, the structures of Public Authorities make them distinct from the 
traditional models of government and often more similar to a corporate structure. They 
are usually governed by a board of some sort, a type of board of directors, consisting of 
some combination of members of the business community, government officials, ex-
officio, and representatives from interested organizations. (Eger, 2000)  While the 
makeup of governing boards can vary from one Authority to another, they are generally 
representative of the aforementioned categories of members. Boards are often appointed 
by policy makers but in many cases, are not legally subject to the creator government. 
Hence, board members may come to their positions through the government but their 
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official role is to serve only the mission of the Authority.  
In a manner similar to private corporations, Public Authorities usually hire 
executive officers to serve at the pleasure of the board. These executives are often 
professionals with experience or expertise in a related business or experienced public 
sector executives. These executives are, in turn, responsible for the daily operations of the 
entity and its operational and personnel activities. In this respect, Authorities are quite 
similar to private firms. The executive officers are responsible to the board but do not 
generally have any direct political ties or obligations. 
Another common aspect of entities that may be characterized as Public 
Authorities is that their financial activities are usually independent of those of their parent 
governments. Some Public Authorities, such as school districts, fall into the category of 
special districts and may have the authority to levy taxes separate from those imposed by 
the parent government. In such cases, however, the entity is often directly subject to the 
approval of the population through measures like elected boards and referendums. The 
focus of this analysis is, on the other hand, those Authorities that do not have direct 
subjugation to the voters and who finance their activities by vehicles other than taxation. 
The most popular vehicle for finance in such entities, and the primary subject of this 
study, is the issuance of debt in the form of bonds. As mentioned earlier, many 
Authorities are created largely for their abilities to fund projects without affecting the 
direct or explicit debt obligations of their parent governments. Hence, a very common 
characteristic of those entities that may be described as Public Authorities is the authority 
to issue public debt. These are by no means the only characteristics of Public Authorities, 
nor do all Authorities fit these characteristics, but these descriptions are important 
identifiers for understanding the basic umbrella term of Public Authorities.  
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Study Overview  
There are myriad entities across the United States that seem to fit the description 
of a Public Authority. However, the task of identifying and categorizing these bodies is a 
daunting one. There is no universally accepted set of characteristics common to all Public 
Authorities and they can have as many different structures, purposes, and activities as 
they have different names. Moreover, there are no recognized information repositories for 
the existence or activities of these entities. As a result, Public Authorities maintain a sort 
of anonymity in the public realm and often operate outside the direct scrutiny of the 
public eye.  
The identification problem in dealing with Public Authorities is, on one hand, one 
of the most compelling aspects of their study and, on the other, one of the field's most 
notable drawbacks.  It is quite difficult to obtain the information necessary to identify 
Authorities and determine into which sub-categories of the umbrella term they may fall 
and, accordingly, equally difficult to collect the data required to analyze the financial 
impacts of their activities. In fact, I was surprised to learn how many of the government 
officials contacted for this study were not familiar with the term Authority and how 
many, following its basic explanation, had little knowledge of the existence or activities 
of such entities within their jurisdictions. A great many of those contacted for this 
analysis could provide only lists of entities, some qualifying as Authorities and some not, 
and little more. They often had little to no understanding of the financial activities of 
these bodies, their legal status with regard to the creator governments, or their levels of 
autonomy or subservience to those governments.  
Despite the difficulties associated with studying Public Authorities, it is my hope 
that this analysis may help us better understand the nature of Public Authorities in 
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selected Kentucky cities and their impacts upon aggregate debt. The goal of this study 
was to first identify those public bodies that qualify under the umbrella term of Public 
Authorities. Second, it was necessary to place these Authorities into sub-categories for 
the purpose of examining their debt financing activities. Next, data related to financial 
activities were collected from the Public Authorities identified in the selected cities along 
with data from the cities themselves. The data were then analyzed to determine the 
effects of Authorities and other possible variables on aggregate debt.  
This study contains a few distinct sections, the first of which is a history of Public 
Authorities in the United States. Following the history will be a discussion of the relevant 
literature that laid the groundwork for this analysis. Next is a section outlining the design, 
data collection methods, and tools of analysis used in the study as well as any threats to 
validity. The fourth section presents the results of the analysis, including the statistical 
results and other empirical findings as well as a discussion of these results and their 
interpretation. Finally, the last section includes some conclusions drawn from the analysis 
along with a discussion of the necessity for further examination. 
 
History 
Through the Roosevelt Era 
The first recognized Public Authority arose with the 1857 creation of the Mersey 
Docks and Harbor Act, by which the British established the Mercey Docks and Harbor 
Board. This act is credited with creating the first special purpose entity or Public 
Authority, known as the Port of London Authority. (Eger, 2000)   
In 1921, Public Authorities emerged in the United States with the Port of New 
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York Authority, since 1972 known as Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. 
(Mitchell, 1996)  This special purpose entity was created in response to the economic 
competition between the two states for which it is now known. In the early twentieth 
century, the shipping industry in and around New York Harbor was chaotic and intense, 
as was the competition between New York and New Jersey to realize its benefits. The 
turmoil between the states came to a head over the issue of the transcontinental railroads, 
on which the local and national economies were heavily dependent. At the time, the 
railroads terminated in New Jersey and passengers and cargo bound for New York City 
had to board ferries for transportation over the Hudson River. During this period, the 
cities on either side of the river owned and operated the piers and the competition for the 
railroad freight resulted in an inefficient mess of delays and high costs. (Eger, 2000)  To 
compound the tension, railroads paid a single price for shipping to New Jersey or New 
York, regardless of the high price of traversing the river. This led the State of New Jersey 
to file a complaint with the Interstate Commerce Commission claiming that the single 
price was discriminatory. New Jersey's complaint was heard and rejected. 
In 1921, five years after the Interstate Commerce disagreed with New Jersey's 
complaint of price discrimination, the legislatures of both states approved the creation of 
a bi-state port authority to improve and manage the transportation systems in the area. 
(Eger, 2000)  The authority was charged with the improvement of the area within a 
twenty-five mile perimeter of the Statue of Liberty. It was given the authority to levy fees 
and charges and was established legally separate and independent from its parent 
governments. That independence meant the Authority had autonomy in managing its own 
financial activities, purchasing and development, and personnel decisions. The creator 
governments did, however, retain authority to subject the financial and managerial 
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policies of the Authority, as reflected in its minutes, to the approval of the Governors of 
both states. As with many modern Public Authorities, this placed the Port Authority in a 
somewhat ambiguously autonomous position; separate and independent from the creator 
government(s) but still to some degree linked.  
This was the first and, for a brief period, the only modern Public Authority in the 
United States. However, due largely to its effectiveness in dealing with the complex 
transportation problems in the Harbor, it was not the only such entity for long. The 
United States had its first glimpse of the potential advantages of an autonomous special 
purpose entity. The Port Authority's singular and focused purpose, its assumed expertise, 
and its freedom from the budgetary and political constraints of its creator governments 
enabled the new entity to untangle and improve a complex situation fraught with 
economic and political competition. While the Port Authority was not a perfect solution 
to the chaos of the Harbor, it substantially improved efficiency and served to relieve a 
great deal of the pressure between the two states as well as the other interested parties. 
(Eger, 2000)  As a result of this success, the popularity of Public Authorities grew and 
other such special purpose entities began to appear shortly thereafter.  
The growth of Public authorities continued throughout the 1930's with such 
notable entities as the New York State Power Authority, created to harness hydroelectric 
energy from the St. Lawrence River for the provision of power to the state. (Eger, 2000) 
Concurrently, the height of the Great Depression did a great deal to spur the growth of 
Public Authorities. At a time when many public agencies were ill-equipped to address the 
economic failings, unemployment, and foreclosures brought on by the depression, 
government corporations, a form of modern Public Authority, offered an attractive 
solution. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal included the creation of 
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numerous Authorities, largely as public works projects to address the staggering 
unemployment. Some of the more notable of the New Deal Authorities were the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Public 
Works Administration. (Axlerod, 1992)  These types of entities were largely favored over 
traditional models of government for their financial autonomy, making them more ideal 
for accurate financial analysis and performance evaluation, freedom from political 
constraints, and focused missions.  
In addition to creating numerous Federal Authorities, Roosevelt's New Deal 
policies also strongly promoted the use of public corporations by state and local 
governments. (Eger, 2000)  The Roosevelt Administration believed that the states could 
benefit from public corporations for the same reasons as the Federal Government. 
Moreover, Roosevelt urged states to use Authorities to circumvent budgetary and debt 
limitations. As a result of the previous successes of Public Authorities as well as the 
promotion on their behalf by the Roosevelt Administration, state and local governments 
created hundreds of these entities throughout the 1930's. (Eger, 2000)  They were created 
in large part to provide utilities such as water, sewer, and electrical systems. However, 
they were also created to address other public issues such as housing and economic 
development. 
It was during this time of great growth for Public Authorities that some of these 
entities began to exhibit their potential drawbacks. All Authorities were created with 
limitations, and many with sunsets, to their activities and their perpetuation. However, in 
the face of these limitations, a few particularly effective executives of public corporations 
went to great lengths to perpetuate and expand their organizations and, thus, their 
positions. The most notable example of this empire building is that of Robert Moses and 
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the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, whose sunset was to coincide with the 
retirement of the entity's outstanding revenue bonds. Moses, seeing the writing of his 
elimination on the wall, prolonged the existence of his organization by extending the 
activities of the Authority well beyond its original purpose and including caveats in the 
bond covenants protecting his own powers. In fact, Moses was so effective in this pursuit 
that his reign did not end until 1967, when his Authority was merged with the 
Metropolitan Transportation Authority. This is an early and important example of the 
potential problems that may arise with autonomous nature of Public Authorities and is 
one of the instances that led to this study. This occurrence demonstrates that the very 
autonomy that makes authorities effective purveyors of public goods may also be an 
inherent danger, as the entities grow to a position and scope beyond the intent of their 
parent governments.  (Axlerod, 1992) 
When the Second World War reached the United States in 1941, governments 
again turned to the then decades-old practice of using special purpose entities to address 
specific public needs. As private firms were slow to respond to the need for wartime 
production, the Roosevelt Administration again intervened to create special purpose 
entities. These entities were created to produce and distribute wartime materials and spur 
the transition from a peacetime to a wartime economy. They ran factories and logistics, 
often in conjunction with or managed entirely by representatives from the private sector. 
These Authorities were instrumental in the Pacific naval buildup as well as Lend Lease 
and the massing of supplies in the European theater. Again, Public Authorities proved to 
be quite adept at addressing specific public needs, particularly in light of time constraints 
when traditional government agencies are notoriously slow to act. 
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The Post-Roosevelt Era to 1960 
In the wake of World War Two, all levels of government stood face to face with 
the neglect of domestic projects arising from their all-out concentration on the war effort. 
The nation's infrastructure was being utilized at full capacity and was in desperate need of 
expansion and improvement. Bridges, roads, and tunnels were often insufficient or in a 
state of disrepair. (Axlerod, 1992)  In addition, water and sewer systems across the 
country were barely, if at all, meeting the needs of the rapidly growing and increasingly 
mobile population. The transition of the United States away from reliance on mass 
transportation to a nation of personal motorists exacerbated these concerns. Roadways 
were insufficient to handle the exponential growth of automobile traffic and, 
concurrently, automobiles were enabling people to move away from metropolitan areas 
and mass transit to new developments in need of infrastructure. (Axlerod, 1992)   
At the same time, veterans were returning home to a vastly changed nation and 
were searching for educations and employment as well as homes. The pressures of a 
growing and mobile population and deteriorating infrastructure left officials in all levels 
of government facing difficult decisions regarding the funding of new and desperately 
needed projects. (Axlerod, 1992)  The prospects of incurring further debt obligations 
were largely unattractive. Even more unattractive were prospects of increasing taxes. 
Facing these two options, always motivation for creative financing, prompted 
governments to again resort to Public Authorities. Across the nation, hundreds of new 
special purpose entities were created to provide for new projects without tax increases or 
increased debt obligation. (Axlerod, 1992)  They were born to create and maintain roads 
and bridges, sewer and water systems, provide opportunities for home ownership, and 
promote a higher rate of employment. Interestingly, when the expansion of the interstate 
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highway system and roadway improvements, all provided by traditional governmental 
entities as well as Public Authorities, decimated private mass transit firms, the public 
takeovers of the failing firms sparked the creation of more special purpose entities. 
AMTRAK and CONRAIL are two examples of pubic corporations that were created to 
salvage failing mass transit systems. (Eger, 2000) 
At the same time, the nationwide demand for higher education expanded and 
public universities were in need of development. They needed to expand campus 
facilities, particularly dormitories. Again, special purpose entities, such as dormitory 
authorities were used to fund and oversee the necessary expansions. (Eger, 2000)  In 
addition, Public Authorities were used to provide tuition assistance for the leagues of 
incoming new students. (Axlerod, 1992)   
In the two decades following the Second World War, governments at all levels 
were faced with backlogged domestic projects resulting from the total resource effort 
demanded by the war. These immediate needs, along with the reluctance of governments 
to increase taxes or incur additional debt obligations, led to the creation of myriad new 
special purpose entities and a continuing increase in the scope of government in 
American lives.  
The 1960's to the Present 
In the 1960"s and 1970's, public distrust of the government grew exponentially. 
Increasingly during this period, the public viewed the government as too powerful and 
too wasteful. In the midst of social upheaval and cultural revolution, there was a palatable 
feeling that the government could not be completely trusted. Exacerbating the problem 
for the government, inflation was rampant by the 1970's and taxpayers were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the service of their elected, appointed, and hired officials. All of these 
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trends compounded to cause governments nationwide to begin to examine their funding 
strategies and enforce financial, statutory, and constitutional constraints. (Axlerod, 
1992)With these constraints, Public Authorities continued to carry favor with some 
governments for their abilities to circumvent ceilings on debt issuance. However, much 
of the public was less than thrilled by use of these entities to incur more debt and many 
saw Authorities as another example of the governments growing and oppressive power. It 
is difficult to guess how many such entities were created to avoid statutory, constitutional 
and budgetary constraints and how many were created to capitalize on the other useful 
characteristics. Whatever the reasons for their creation, Authorities born during this these 
two decades were viewed largely with suspicion and distrust or "a ploy to beat the 
system" (Axlerod, 1992). At the same time, corruption became a centerpiece of public 
conversation as scandals involving everyone from local officials to the President of the 
United States dominated the news. With specific regard to Public Authorities, special 
purpose entities from no less than fifteen states came under investigation during the 
1970's for allegations of bribery, extortion, and other various forms of corruption. This 
period was a difficult one for all levels of government and Public Authorities were not 
immune to the public's general dissatisfaction.  
This sense of distrust continued into the 1980's, although it was tempered by 
slowed inflation and a recovering economy. (Eger, 2000)  The constraints brought on 
during the 1960's and 1970's continued as well while governments were facing increasing 
demand for improved infrastructure. This climate provided for the continued growth of 
Public Authorities, as public sentiment against tax increases and growing budget deficits 
coincided with the demand for public projects. (Eger, 2000)  Governments again turned 
to special purpose entities. Opponents of special purpose entities managed a few small 
 23
victories during this period, as restrictions were placed on the types of projects that 
qualified for funding by tax-exempt securities. (Eger, 2000)  However, when the separate 
status of special purpose entities was formally challenged, courts at the state and federal 
levels repeatedly found them to be legally independent entities. 
The nineteen eighties also witnessed the largest collapse of such an entity in 
United States history, in the form of the Washington Public Power Supply System 
(WPPSS) default, demonstrating the potential harm that may come if a Public Authority 
is improperly managed (Leigland and Lamb, 1986). WPPSS was created to build, 
operate, and manage electrical power generation and transmission facilities in the State of 
Washington. This Authority enjoyed all the benefits of administrative and financial 
independence from its creator government, the State, commonly afforded such entities. It 
issued debt in large quantities in the form of tax-exempt bonds and, in the summer of 
1983, defaulted on $2.5 billion of these obligations. (Leigland and Lamb, 1986)   
This default severely damaged the municipal bond market and sparked numerous 
lawsuits by lenders in an effort to collect the defaulted obligations from the creator 
government. (Eger, 2000)  As in other cases, the courts found that WPPSS was legally 
separate and that its obligations were its own.  The lenders were unable to recover their 
losses from the state government. (Leigland and Lamb, 1986)  While the State was not 
found to be obligated to the lenders in the face of the default, it was not absolved of 
responsibility. Washington was left with a power system in disarray, a public whose trust 
had been damaged, and the responsibility of restoring both to a suitable level. This is a 
very good example of what can happen when a Public Authority is granted autonomy, 
operates outside the reach of the public and elected officials, and does so with reckless 
negligence. Even though the government was not statutorily obligated for the defaulted 
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debt, it was left with the expensive and time-consuming task of undoing the damage done 
by the mismanagement of the independent Authority. While this represents the most 
extreme scenario, smaller defaults happen from time to time and, in the event an 
Authority should collapse altogether, the parent government is left to pick up the pieces. 
Today, special purpose entities remain as powerful a force as ever and their 
proportion to the rest of the public sector continues to grow. Opponents still claim that 
they are created to circumvent funding constraints, that they operate outside the reach of 
the public and officials, that their use of tax-exempt securities to generate funds creates 
economic inefficiencies, and that these securities are large federal tax expenditures and a 
drain on the U.S. Government. Nevertheless, the usefulness of Public Authorities in the 
provision of public goods seems to drown out their opponents and the growth of special 
purpose entities continues. While their uses have been restricted and they are often 
viewed with skepticism, they provide for popular projects that might not otherwise be 
feasible or palatable and thus, right or wrong, continue to grow in size and number. 
 
Review of Relevant Literature 
This section is a discussion of the works that were instrumental in the 
development of this analysis. The following scholars have advanced theories on many 
aspects of special purpose entities, ranging from characterization and categorization to 
financial and performance evaluation. Each of these scholars has contributed to the study 
of special purpose entities and these contributions are outlined hereinafter in the context 
of this study.  
 
 25
James Leigland 
In chapter 19 of The Handbook of Municipal Bonds and Public Finance, (Lamb, 
et. al., 1993) “Overview of Public Authorities and Special Districts,” Leigland provides a 
good and comprehensive understanding of the entities discussed in this study.  He 
examines the general characteristics of special purpose entities as well as the purposes for 
their creation.  The general characteristics he identifies largely correspond to those 
identified by other scholars and include corporate status, legal separation from the creator 
government, independence and flexibility derived from a “business-like” status, 
governing boards (usually appointed), and the ability to access private money markets.  
He divides special purpose entities into two general categories: public authorities and 
special districts.  He identifies the common distinctions that special districts, unlike 
public authorities, generally have elected rather than appointed boards, are smaller, have 
the authority to levy taxes, and do not issue debt.  However, Leigland wisely points out 
that these generalizations do not always apply.  In many states there are entities that blur 
these distinctions by demonstrating characteristics that apply to both public authorities 
and special districts.  Some entities best described as public authorities are authorized to 
levy taxes and some special districts issue general obligation or revenue bonds.  
Throughout his work, Leigland discusses the roles, scopes, purposes, and characteristics 
of these types of entities while demonstrating the difficulty in categorization.  He 
illustrates a wide variety of uses and structures across the spectrum of special purpose 
entities.   
While Leigland explains that fitting these entities into specific categories is 
problematic, he is able to offer some useful tools for understanding organizations 
generally described as special purpose entities.  He enumerates a set of advantages and 
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disadvantages that helps us better understand the nature of special purpose entities as a 
whole.  Finally, Leigland offers three conclusions that may derived from the evidence he 
presented.  First, authorities and districts have been useful purveyors of public goods by 
increasing access to the bond market, facilitating timely construction management, and 
by providing for administrative and financial arrangements for services across multiple 
jurisdictions.  They also allow for the circumvention of state and local restrictions 
pertaining to financing activities.  Second, he concludes that the primary weakness of the 
corporate form of government is the tendency of special purpose entities, by any name, to 
remain isolated from broader policy planning frameworks.  Third, government officials at 
all levels need much more complete information on the activities of government 
corporations in order to arrive at better and cost-effective decisions regarding their use. 
In “Public Authorities and the Determinants of Their Use by State and Local 
Governments,” Leigland examines the general concepts associated with special purpose 
governments and how they contribute to our understanding of these entities.  (Leigland, 
1994)  He concludes that the public authority concept has drawn attention to the 
widespread use of these forms of government but it has not contributed much to our 
understanding of why the use of these entities is widespread.  In the second part of his 
study, Leigland attempts to address this lack of understanding and explain the prevalence 
of public authorities.  He explains that there are two general rationales for their use.  
Supporters claim that public authorities allow for better management in the provision of 
public goods and services and promote their businesslike structures.  Critics, however, 
argue that authorities are simply borrowing machines used to circumvent financing 
regulations.  Leigland constructs a model for the proliferation of public authorities, using 
independent variables to explain the dependent variables, special purpose debt 
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outstanding and total number of special purpose governments.  His conclusion is that the 
ability to raise money, rather than businesslike management, accounts for most of the 
popularity of public authorities.   
It is in the second part of this study, in which he examined determinants of the use 
of Authorities, that Leigland demonstrated some important variables associated with 
special purpose entities.  His use of these determinants, including population, density, tax 
capacity, and intergovernmental revenues, to examine the use of Authorities served as 
guidance for the work you currently read.  He demonstrated that these variables may 
indeed correlate with the use of Public Authorities and, perhaps by extension, the 
issuance of debt.  This part of Leigland's study was the empirical precedent for this 
analysis. 
Leigland's work is useful in understanding the general concepts of public 
authorities and their characteristics.  He illustrates the scope and uses of authorities and 
points out advantages and disadvantages.  Perhaps most significantly, he demonstrates 
that despite the apparent usefulness of the businesslike structure of authorities, the ability 
to raise money for projects beyond the financial scope of traditional governments is the 
driving force behind their proliferation.  This may lead one to question whether or not the 
fund-raising capabilities of public authorities open the door for undesirable levels of debt 
issuance or other unsound financial management.  Moreover, Leigland points out the 
need for better and more complete information regarding the activities of public 
authorities both for the sake of study and for better public administration.  This is a theme 
that will be revisited in this study.  
R A Cropf, G D Wendel 
Cropf and Wendel's article The Determinants of Municipal Debt Policy: a pooled 
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time series analysis helped to provide some of the variables for this study.  In their study, 
the authors analyzed the effects of certain social, political, and economic factors on 
municipal debt behavior in a pooled time-series regression model.  They found that these 
factors increased the cities' reliance upon revenue debt but not on general obligation debt.  
They pointed out a prevalent political stance of circumvention, with the cities taking the 
issues out of the voters’ hands by turning to revenue debt.  While not specifically relevant 
to this study, as it does not deal with aggregate debt or Authorities, their work 
demonstrated that several determinants of municipal debt can be observed.  Namely, they 
identified tax revenues and expenditures, population density, and intergovernmental aid 
as determinants of debt policy.  By extension, we should be able to apply most of the 
same determinants to aggregate debt. 
Guntram B. Wolff 
In Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Causes, Wolff 
reinforces some of these determinants of municipal debt.  The main purpose of Wolff's 
study was to identify two categories of causes leading to fiscal problems in a sample of 
900 U.S. Cities.  Wolff found that structural problems such as immigration and 
congestion were more important to the fiscal crises than were non-structural causes such 
as weak mayors and union power.  While this is not particularly important to the work 
you currently read, Wolff's examined debt issuance, particularly excessive debt, as a 
contributor to fiscal crisis in the cities.  In so doing, the author presented several possible 
variables to explain debt issuance.  Among these were income, tax revenue, expenditures, 
population, population growth, population density, and intergovernmental aid.  This 
serves to reinforce the use of these proposed determinants for the present study.   
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Jerry Mitchell 
Mitchell's work reminds us of the inherent difficulties with trying to evaluate the 
effects of special purpose entities or trying to characterize them or their effects as "good" 
or "bad." As Mitchell readily points out, there are so many types of Authorities and 
opinions regarding what these entities should do, how they should behave, and what roles 
they should play, it is difficult to make general assertions about them as a group. 
(Mitchell, 1996)  He discusses the usefulness as well as the drawbacks in the course of 
addressing the general characteristics of Public Authorities. The discussion provides an 
ideal background for the research of special purpose entities, as he dwells on the nature 
and roles of Public Authorities, the reasons for their use, their origins and history, and, 
most importantly for this study, issues related to public debt. Mitchell discusses types of 
special purpose entity debt and some of the mechanics of its issuance, as well as 
influences on Authorities and issues of performance evaluation.  
Perhaps his contribution of greatest relevance to this work is found in Public 
Authorities and Government Debt: Practices and Issues (1996).  In this article, Mitchell 
identifies often latent problems with Public Authorities, aside from the difficulty of 
characterization and evaluation in general. The three problems identified in his work are 
defaults, reliance on intergovernmental subsidies, and "out of control" debt financing. 
The defaults, suggests Mitchell, may be occurring with growing frequency as special 
purpose entities are issuing bonds backed by revenue streams that are increasingly 
uncertain or elastic. The second issue Mitchell suggests is that Authorities may be 
becoming increasingly reliant upon intergovernmental subsidies. Not only would this be 
financially difficult for Authorities, having to make ends meet with the help of subsidies, 
but it would denigrate the purpose for creating Authorities in the first place. An Authority 
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that relies heavily upon intergovernmental subsidies diminishes the very independence 
and autonomy that make it an attractive alternative to traditional governmental models.  
Finally, Mitchell addresses concerns that the debt financing activities of some 
Authorities may be out of control.  He presents some evidence to that effect as well as 
statistics showing special purpose entity debt rising far more rapidly than the debt of 
traditional government entities.  Mitchell also suggests that Authorities may be 
diversifying their activities and overextending debt in an effort of self preservation, or to 
perpetuate the existence of the entity.  All of these factors, he contends, may combine to 
suggest that Authorities are issuing irresponsible levels of debt.  However, he cautions us 
about making general assertions about Authorities.  It is difficult to tell, he notes, how 
many and which Authorities are issuing responsible levels of debt.  A few instances of 
reckless mismanagement, he warns, may not be enough to indict the genre for being out 
of control. Mitchell, however, does advance some suggestions ranging from simply 
reforming of Authorities to eliminating certain Authorities altogether.  Again, what we 
draw from this part of his work is that there is no universal definition or set of 
characteristics for Authorities and is, hence, no universal tool for evaluating them or 
correcting for those that have gone awry.  
Robert J. Eger III 
Bob Eger’s 2000 dissertation on Public Authorities was instrumental in devising 
this study.  He examines the broad concept of Public Authorities and their functions in 
state and local governments.  It is from Eger’s dissertation that this study borrows the 
nomenclature special purpose entity, used interchangeably with Public Authority as an 
umbrella term to describe the types of public, corporate entities examined herein.  This 
categorization is demonstrated in Appendix A.   
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Eger’s dissertation also provides the three subcategories in which these entities 
are grouped for study: government corporations, public authorities, and special districts.  
He analyzed how special purpose entities are employed by state governments to carry out 
a variety of functions, particularly, how they are utilized for financial management.  Eger 
also contributes a set of characteristics for each of the three subcategories of special 
purpose entities, from which this study draws extensively.  His differentiation is 
demonstrated in Appendix B.  Ultimately, Eger concluded from his analysis that there is 
evidence of three distinct subcategories of special purpose entities as theorized.  He found 
that the three types of entities are separated by financial and administrative characteristics 
and that these characteristics are instrumental in understanding the nature and functions 
of special purpose entities. 
This typology was an important first step in this study.  It provided a starting point 
for the analysis of special purpose entities and established characteristics and categories 
for their study.  By first differentiating between the types of authorities and their 
distinctions, it was then possible to narrow the focus of the study to those entities that 
possessed the most autonomous traits.  Eger provided the tools and understanding to 
distinguish between the groups of special purpose entities and effectively analyze their 
activities and the implications of their use.      
 
Design and Validity 
There are as many reasons for local governments to create Public Authorities as 
there are names for those entities. Whatever the variety of names, structures, or functions 
these special purpose entities assume, it seems apparent that generalization of Authorities 
for the purpose of study is problematic. As several scholars have demonstrated, 
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Authorities differ so often in from and function that it is quite difficult to make any 
blanket statements about their activities, behavior, or effects. (Mitchell, 1996)  With that 
in mind, this study attempts to examine the relationships between the presence and types 
of Public Authorities and the levels of aggregate debt in a selection of Kentucky's 
prominent cities. It is important to note that, as much as I might like this study to 
represent a microcosm of Authorities on a national or general level, this can in the end be 
only a study of those Authorities specifically examined and the jurisdictions in which 
they operate. In other words, this analysis of Kentucky cities should not necessarily be 
used to make general assertions about authorities at large.  
This is a study of the some of Commonwealth's most populous cities and the 
special purpose entities that operate within their boundaries. The object of the study is to 
examine the effects of certain factors, particularly the use of Public Authorities, on 
aggregate debt in Kentucky's cities. As mentioned earlier, the statistical variable of 
interest in this study, the dependent variable, is aggregate debt. Aggregate debt, as 
reported by the local governments to the Governors Office for Local Development, is the 
total of the outstanding, publicly held debt in the defined area.  This includes all general 
obligation municipal debt, as well as outstanding direct obligation municipal revenue 
bonds and notes. This also includes the outstanding debt of all other public entities 
operating in the area; like public parking corporations, river port authorities, housing 
authorities, airports, and any other special districts. (GOLD, 2004)   
The Independent variables in which this study is interested are those factors one 
might reasonably believe to have a correlation with debt issuance. These variables 
include statistics like population and assessed property value as well the activities of 
Public Authorities.  A number of the variables are economic indicators or demographic 
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statistics and a few have been designed by the author to help examine the activities of 
Public Authorities. The table of statistics used in this analysis is displayed in its entirety 
in appendix D. 
Data collection for this study was conducted in a number of ways, beginning with 
the independent research of literature and published studies. Some of the data for the 
analysis were available through repositories like the US Census Bureau, the Kentucky 
League of Cities, and the Governor's Office for Local Development, Commonwealth of 
Kentucky. However, while I was able to obtain a number of the base statistics through 
on-line and printed publications and information repositories, little of the data specifically 
pertaining to Public Authorities was readily available. As will be discussed later in this 
study, one of the most formidable problems associated with Public Authorities is that 
they operate largely beyond the view of the public. These large organizations exist in 
relative obscurity compared to their creator governments, yet they provide many of the 
services most directly impacting the citizens on a daily basis.  
However large, the separate status of the entities in which this study is particularly 
interested means that the financial data are decentralized and sometimes difficult to 
locate. In fact, the mere existence and numbers of the Authorities in each municipality 
were more elusive than expected.  Hence, the second phase of data collection consisted of 
telephone and face to face interviews.  Chief Financial Officers and Directors of Finance 
of local governments were the primary targets of the initial interviews, although in larger 
cities, administrators within Finance Departments tended to have more specific 
information and were more available for interviews.   
First, the interviewees were given an outline of the characteristics generally 
applicable to Public Authorities.  Some were already acutely aware of the terminology 
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while others required some explanation of the types of entities in which this study was 
interested.  Next, the government officials were asked to identify as many entities as 
possible within their jurisdictions that may fit the general description, as prescribed 
earlier in this study, of special purpose entities.  From this list, the interviewees were then 
asked to discuss any characteristics known of the entities, including purpose, structure, 
financing activities, administrative activities, whether and when they must seek approval 
from the creator governments for their activities, and any specific data they may have 
available.   
These were informal interviews and were conducted without a specific set of 
questions, as different interviewees had different areas of expertise and access to different 
types of information.  The result of this round of informal interviews was a general 
perspective of the types and scopes of entities operating in each area.  In some cases, 
these interviewees provided very detailed information regarding all the Public Authorities 
in the jurisdiction.  In most cases, however, much more investigation was necessary.  
Finally, the interviewees were asked for a list of contacts within the local government 
and, ideally, within the Public Authorities themselves. 
For each city, the list of contacts was then explored to verify the information 
given by local officials and to obtain more complete information directly from the Public 
Authorities.  Most of the information provided from separate sources seemed consistent 
and the specific financial data and organizational characteristics provided a clearer 
picture of the structures and activities of the Public Authorities.   
As shown in Appendix D, both quantitative and qualitative data were collected for 
this study.  Quantitative statistics like population, property value, and aggregate debt 
were obtained from published sources, while the general autonomy of Authorities in each 
 35
city, the qualitative measure, was determined from the information provided by informal 
interviews.   
The study borrows from Eger's typology to characterize each Authority in terms 
of administrative and financial autonomy.  (Eger, 2000)  Authorities were identified and 
placed into sub-categories according to the criteria in Appendix B.  Next, information 
provided in the interviews was used to identify “autonomous Authorities” according to 
the criteria in Appendix C.  Note again that Authorities best described as special districts 
were discarded from the study as separate types of entities that do not generally issue 
debt.  If any Authorities in a city were shown to be autonomous according to the model, 
the city was then placed in the category of those cities having autonomous Authorities, 
demonstrated by an entry of 1 in the field “Aut” in Appendix D.  The data in Appendix D 
were then subjected to statistical analyses to examine any correlations between the 
proposed determinants of aggregate debt, or independent variables, and the dependent 
variable aggregate debt per capita, as well as any differences of statistical significance 
between those municipalities with autonomous Public Authorities and those without 
autonomous Authorities. 
Below are the enumerated steps used in this analysis: 
1. A nonrandom sample was collected to represent municipalities in Kentucky with 
constituent populations exceeding 18,000 residents. 
2. Statistical data were gathered from published sources for use as independent variables. 
3. Governments were contacted in the sample cities for interviews to identify Public 
Authorities.  Using criteria derived from literary research, particularly Eger, Mitchell, 
and Leigland, combined with the information provided by interviewees, entities were 
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identified as possible Public Authorities. 
4. Those identified as possible Public Authorities were verified as such through further 
research and grouped into categories per Appendix A and Appendix B.  Special 
districts were discarded, leaving public authorities and government corporations.  
5. The remaining Authorities were then examined according to the criteria in Appendix 
C for characteristics of administrative and financial autonomy. 
6. From these criteria, the presence of “autonomous Authorities” was determined for 
each city.   
7. The data were entered into the table in Appendix D for use in statistical analyses to 
examine the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable aggregate debt, as well as any differences of statistical significance between 
municipalities with autonomous Authorities and those without autonomous 
Authorities. 
 
Issues of validity 
Internal Validity -  
History is a significant threat to the internal validity of this model, as determinants 
other than those identified herein as independent variables may act to affect the levels of 
aggregate debt per capita in each of the cities.  This threat is one that cannot be 
eliminated but, rather, must be mitigated.  In order to completely eliminate this threat, 
this model would have to account for factors that cannot be identified, qualified, or 
quantified.  Moreover, to completely eliminate the history threat, this model would have 
to account for all the possible determinants of aggregate debt, which could include 
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constituent preferences, political motives and other variables that are difficult to pinpoint.  
This threat to validity must be understood but it does not in itself detract significantly 
from the model.  It is not necessary to account for all the determinants of aggregate debt 
in order to conceptualize the relationships between the variables in this study.  More 
specifically, we need not identify every determinant of aggregate debt in order to 
understand the relationship between Public Authorities and aggregate debt.  The hope 
here is to include as many relevant variables as possible and simply concede that the 
inability to include some variables such as constituent preferences is a threat to validity. 
Selection is a second threat to the internal validity of this model, as it is 
nonrandom.  The population being examined in this study is Kentucky municipal 
governments with constituent populations greater than 18, 000.  While this is technically 
a threat to the internal validity of the design, I do not think it will significantly affect the 
analysis.  I do not think there are any factors influencing my selection of this sample that 
will have a discernible affect on the analysis. 
There are two main types of threats to the internal validity of this model.  The 
history threat is one that cannot be avoided.  One must simply be mindful of this threat 
and view this model and the ensuing analysis in the context of that understanding.  The 
second threat is a selection threat.  Again, it would have been possible to randomize the 
selection of the sample from the population of municipal governments with over 18, 000 
residents.  However, I am unaware of any traits or characteristics that influenced my 
selection of these governments for the sample.  They were chosen arbitrarily, with no 
prior knowledge of any of the data to be collected.  Moreover, all of the governments 
originally selected for the sample were included in the final analysis.  For example, even 
if the collection of data was abnormally difficult for a given municipal government, that 
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government was not omitted from the study.  Such serious selection threats were avoided, 
at a substantial cost of time, to ensure the internal validity of this study.   
If there is one specific result of the selection threat that stands out, it is that the 
sample seems to represent the more widely known of Kentucky's cities.  These are simply 
the first cities that came to mind when thinking of a short list of Kentucky's larger 
municipal governments.  This, however, is still not a serious threat to the internal validity 
of the model.  It is, rather, something that must be pointed out and understood in order to 
better grasp the purpose and results of this study. 
External Validity- 
The most substantial shortcomings of this model are threats to external validity.  
There are two types of external validity threats at work in this model, one related to the 
structure of the model and one related to the nature of the subjects.   
Selection.  The first threat that makes it difficult to generalize the results of this 
model is similar to the selection problem that threatens its internal validity.  With a 
nonrandom sample, limited in size by time constraints, the selection threat is formidable.  
While selection posed only a minor threat to internal validity, the threat to external 
validity is sizable.  It is possible that this analysis may be loosely generalizable within the 
population of municipal governments from which this sample was taken.  However, 
selection threats seriously limit the extent to which this analysis may be generalized 
outside this population.   
Setting.  This threat to external validity arises from the nature of the subjects 
rather than the structure of the analysis.  The ability to generalize this analysis outside the 
selected population is severely limited by differences in locations and settings of 
municipalities.  As many scholars have explained, the uses and natures of Public 
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Authorities vary between cities, states, and regions, largely without any discernible 
patterns.  In other words, our ability to generalize the results of this analysis outside the 
selected population would be hampered by the effects of multiple settings.  Different 
states and regions have very different preferences with regard to Public Authorities and 
debt issuance. 
History is another threat to external validity that arises more from the nature of 
the subjects rather than the structure of the analysis.   Again, it is difficult to generalize 
the results of this analysis beyond the sample and population when one considers the 
myriad forces that may combine to affect levels of aggregate debt.  Moreover, as those 
authors cited in this study have noted, Public Authorities are difficult to classify or 
characterize in general terms.  As a result, with so many entities with such varying 
characteristics, it is problematic to assume any generalizations regarding Public 
Authorities beyond the samples and populations. 
These threats have some effects on the context in which this study should be 
viewed.  The threats to the internal validity are minimal and should not have much of an 
effect on the analysis.  As mentioned, we must be mindful of the fact that other factors 
not accounted for by this model may influence levels of aggregate debt.  Furthermore, the 
sample is small and nonrandom.  Ideally, we would like to eliminate both of these threats 
but, given the nature of the subject and the time constraints at hand, it is best to simply 
keep them in mind throughout the analysis.  They should be noticed but they are not 
likely to seriously affect the results of the model.   
The threats to the external validity are testament to the difficulty inherent in 
generalizing such a model beyond the original population.  The fact that the sample is 
small and nonrandom combined with the affects of setting and history threats on the 
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dependent variable make it unreasonable to assume generalization is possible.  This could 
be addressed, and the model strengthened, by increasing the size of and randomizing the 
sample.  However, time constraints on this study precluded such an effort.  The effects of 
setting and history could perhaps be mitigated by the introduction of new and complex 
variables to account for differences in location and factors not currently explained by the 
model.  The addition of certain variables and the replication of the analysis in different 
settings would likely strengthen the model.  Again, however, these steps would have been 
beyond the constraints of this analysis.    
Even though the threats to external validity are formidable, they do not severely 
damage this study.  It would be ideal to develop models that could be generalized across 
locations to deal with the many factors influencing Public Authorities and aggregate debt.  
It would also be a monumental task.  This model is not intended to describe the 
relationship between the independent variables and aggregate debt on a national or even a 
regional level.  This study is one of Kentucky’s municipal governments.  It should lend 
insight into the nature of the relationships between the variables in Kentucky and could 
perhaps even tempt us to draw some loose conclusions about Authorities and debt en 
mass.  However, the limitations placed on this study lead to threats to external validity 
that preclude us from generalizing the results outside the chosen population.  The study 
however, may still tell us something about Kentucky’s municipalities and the variables 
included herein.  Moreover, it may give us a better of idea of what other steps are 
necessary to better understand Public Authorities and the factors influencing aggregate 
debt.     
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Analysis and Results 
The following section is a discussion of the empirical analyses used to test the 
hypotheses that correlations exist between certain determinants of aggregate debt and the 
levels of aggregate debt per capita in Kentucky's municipalities, as well as the hypothesis 
that the presence of autonomous Authorities is associated with levels of aggregate debt 
per capita in these municipalities. 
Independent Variables 
The following variables are those hypothesized to have some correlation with the 
levels of aggregate debt in the sample municipalities. 
Population Shift (PopShift) 
There are some logical and intuitive conclusions that may be reached with a very 
basic analysis of the data.  First, looking at the percent change in population from 200 to 
2003, it seems that there may be some sort of relationship between the variables.  One 
particular aspect stands out at first glance.  The one municipal government that 
experienced a decline in population over this period has the lowest aggregate debt per 
capita by a considerable margin.  This seems to support the theory that growth in 
population has a positive correlation with aggregate debt.  However, simply arranging the 
data in ascending order of population growth and examining the levels of aggregate debt 
suggests that other factors are certainly at play, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Paducah -2.90%  $834.95  1 
Owensboro 0.45%  $8,414.56 6 
Jefferson County 0.78%  $3,706.18 5 
Fayette County 2.41%  $1,926.64 3 
Bowling Green  2.77%  $1,852.51 2 
Florence  4.83%  $2,058.27 4 
According to the data, there are several other factors at work in determining the 
level of aggregate debt in a municipality.  An inference that would be worth further 
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exploration is the notion that perhaps, while population growth by itself may not be a 
strong determinant of aggregate debt, a loss of population over a period may limit the 
amount of debt a municipality is willing to issue.  Perhaps while the growth is positive, 
population shift is not a powerful determinant of aggregate debt but, when the population 
begins to decrease, debt issuance is somewhat curtailed.   
Population Density (Dens) 
Density has been widely accepted by scholars as a significant determinant of debt 
issuance.  Theoretically, the more people per square mile the greater the need for 
extensive and costly infrastructure projects.  Moreover, urbanization often gives rise to 
large housing authorities or other such debt-issuing entities that address the needs of 
urban societies.  If the data reflect this theory, we would see aggregate debt increasing 
with population density.  We can see in figure 2 that the data do not exactly follow that 
theory but he overall trend does appear to be positive.  In general, aggregate debt is 
higher with the top three municipalities in population density than with the lower three.   
 
Figure 2.1 
 
Fayette County  $915.60  $1,926.64 3 
Paducah  $1,350.20 $834.95  1 
Bowling Green  $1,392.30 $1,852.51 2 
Jefferson County  $1,801.20 $3,706.18 5 
Florence   $2,379.00 $2,058.27 4 
Owensboro  $3,102.90 $8,414.56 6 
 
  Furthermore, before dismissing this theory we should consider that one of 
the municipalities, Fayette Co., is a merged city-county government and that Jefferson Co 
is a county government just prior to merger (used as the closest possible approximation to 
the merged Louisville Metro Government).  This means that the population density of the 
municipality is decreased by the addition of some sparsely populated, outlying areas.  It is 
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possible that Figure 2 is skewed slightly by comparing purely city governments and 
merged governments.  To examine this notion, Fayette Co. was removed and the City of 
Louisville was substituted for Jefferson County to derive Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
Paducah  $1,350.20 $834.95  1 
Bowling Green  $1,392.30 $1,852.51 2 
Florence   $2,379.00 $2,058.27 4 
Owensboro  $3,102.90 $8,414.56 5 
Louisville  $4,124.90 $1948.48 3 
 
This still does not provide a linear correlation between the variables but some 
relationship seems evident.  It is quite possible that the difficulty in comparing merged 
and traditional governments in this respect is too difficult a task with such a small 
sample.  We might find with a larger sample that there is a linear or curvilinear, positive 
correlation between density and aggregate debt.  Even this small dataset seems to suggest 
some trend of the like.   
Property Value per Capita (PropVal) 
Intuitively, one might expect that the assessed property value per capita of a 
municipality might have an inverse correlation with aggregate debt, or that as value 
increases, revenue would increase and the need to issue debt would decrease.  Figure 3 
illustrates the relationship between these variables without controlling for other factors. 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
Bowling Green  $14,539.89 $1,852.51 2 
Owensboro  $37,836.58 $8,414.56 6 
Paducah  $43,921.00 $834.95  1 
Jefferson County  $51,631.05 $3,706.18 5 
Fayette County  $62,762.20 $1,926.64 3 
Florence   $72,987.29 $2,058.27 4 
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The relationship between assessed property value per capita and aggregate debt 
shown appears to be random.  While it is hard to draw conclusions from a small sample, 
there does not seem to any significant interaction between these variables and perhaps 
property value is not a useful determinant of aggregate debt.  Since there does not appear 
to be any correlation at first glance and since property value is accounted for in tax 
revenue, another independent variable in this study, property value per capita does not 
appear to be a useful determinant of aggregate debt. 
Tax Revenue per Capita (TaxRev) 
Like property value per capita, one might expect tax revenue per capita to 
correlate negatively with aggregate debt.  This notion assumes that a municipal 
government collecting greater revenues per capita could rely more on pay as you go 
(paygo) funding and slightly less on debt financing.  Figure 4 displays the relationship 
between tax revenue and aggregate debt per capita without controlling for other variables. 
 
Figure 4 
 
Owensboro  $396  $8,414.56 6 
Jefferson County  $515  $3,706.18 5 
Florence   $577  $2,058.27 4 
Bowling Green  $623  $1,852.51 2 
Paducah  $718  $834.95  1 
Fayette County  $737  $1,926.64 3 
Here it looks as though there is a negative correlation between tax revenue and 
aggregate debt per capita, even with a small sample.  Even though the data do not 
demonstrate a perfectly linear correlation, they do suggest that the hypothesis that 
revenue and aggregate debt are negatively correlated is plausible.  Further analysis will 
examine this relationship.   
Intergovernmental Revenue as a Percent of Total Revenue (InterRev) 
Intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total revenue is another possible 
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indicator of the level of aggregate debt held in a municipality.  The assumption here 
would be that those municipalities that rely heavily upon intergovernmental aid would be 
the same that incur large amounts of aggregate debt.  This would not represent a causal 
relationship but might nevertheless correlate with debt issuance.  The percentages of 
intergovernmental revenue are displayed in figure 5, along with the levels and ranks of 
aggregate debt per capita in the sample municipalities.  
 
Figure 5 
 
Florence   6.68%  $2,058.27 4 
Paducah  12.2%  $834.95  1 
Bowling Green  14.36%  $1,852.51 2 
Fayette Co  15.81%  $1,926.64 3 
Owensboro  20.07%  $8,414.56 6 
Jefferson Co  23.39%  $3,706.18 5 
 
According to the data, there does not appear to be a linear relationship between 
these two variables.  However, as those with high percentages of intergovernmental 
revenue tend to have higher aggregate debt in general, this variable as a determinant of 
debt will be revisited in further analysis. 
Presence of Autonomous Authorities (Aut) 
Figure 7 illustrates those municipalities identified as having autonomous Public 
Authorities and those who do not, per Appendix D, as well as the amounts and ranks of 
aggregate debt per capita.  If the hypothesis that autonomous Authorities are associated 
with higher aggregate debt per capita is true, we would expect to see a positive 
correlation between the variables. 
Figure 7 
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Fayette Co  0 $1,926.64 3  
Florence   0 $2,058.27 4  
Paducah  1 $834.95  1 
Bowling Green  1 $1,852.51 2 
Jefferson Co  1 $3,706.18 5  
Owensboro  1 $8,414.56 6 
 
Based on the data, there does not appear to be any correlation between the two 
variables.  To substantiate this initial perception any possible relationship between the 
two will be more closely examined in the subsequent analyses. 
Through basic interpretation of the data obtained, we can see that a few variables 
seem to have some correlation with aggregate debt in the selected municipalities.  The 
following section further examines these possible relationships using statistical methods. 
 
 
 
Statistical Analysis 
Correlation Coefficients 
First, in order to examine the basic correlations between the variables, the 
coefficients of correlation were determined and are shown below. 
                   Aggregate Debt      
    AggDebt     1.0000 
    AuthDebt    0.1585    
    Aut             0.3213    
    InterRev      0.5789    
    TaxRev      -0.8889   
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    PropVal     -0.1567    
    Dens           0.8106   
    PopShift    -0.0596   
The primary variable of interest in this study, the presence of autonomous 
Authorities (Aut), has a relatively weak positive correlation with the dependent variable 
aggregate debt (AggDebt).  According to the data, there is little correlation between the 
presence of autonomous Authorities, as defined by the study, and the levels of aggregate 
debt in the sample cities.  This does not necessarily mean that no relationship exists but 
the data do not seem to support such a correlation. 
Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev), on the other hand, appears to have a strong 
negative correlation with aggregate debt.  The data here support the theory that an 
increase in tax revenue per capita corresponds to a decrease in aggregate debt.  It is 
possible that municipalities with higher tax revenue per capita rely less on debt financing 
than their counterparts with lower per capita revenues. 
As hypothesized, population density (Dens) has a relatively strong positive 
correlation with aggregate debt.  Though .8106 is far from a perfect correlation, it is a 
substantial correlation.  The data support the theory that densely populated areas will 
have a higher level of aggregate debt per capita than sparsely populated areas.  As 
mentioned earlier, this is likely due to the special public needs arising from urbanization 
such as dense and extensive infrastructure. 
Intergovernmental revenue as a percent of total revenue (InterRev) has a weaker 
positive correlation with aggregate debt with a coefficient of .5789.  This correlation is 
not causal but, more likely, arises from municipalities turning to both intergovernmental 
aid and debt financing to compensate for a lack of available funds.  In other words, a 
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municipality with relatively little available funding may turn to debt financing and 
qualify for intergovernmental aid to a greater extent than those with greater available 
funds.  It seems logical that InterRev and AggDebt would be correlated, as municipalities 
rely on both for the same reasons.  The coefficient is, however, not as strong as expected.  
This may be attributable to the small sample size, as intergovernmental revenue is 
generally an accepted indicator of levels of municipal debt. 
The correlation coefficients displayed above support the hypotheses that tax 
revenue per capita, population density, and to a lesser extent, intergovernmental revenue 
as a percent of total revenue have some correlation with aggregate debt.  However, the 
rest of the variables hypothesized to correlate with aggregate debt have relatively weak 
associations with the dependent variable.  This may be due in some part to the small 
sample size and or the threats to internal validity discussed later.  In other words, this 
does not mean we should rule out these variables as determinants of aggregate debt.  
However, the data only support the hypotheses that tax revenue per capita and population 
density are accurate determinants of aggregate debt. 
Regression 
To further analyze the relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables in this study, those variables for which the initial analysis suggested a 
correlation were subjected to simple regression analyses.  First, tax revenue per capita 
was found in the initial analysis to correlate negatively with aggregate debt.  To further 
examine this association, the following regression model was used: 
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + εi     
Where: 
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Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities 
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities 
β1 = Slope for TaxRev for Kentucky cities 
Xi  = Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev) for the population of Kentucky cities 
εi = Random error in Y for observation i 
The regression model was intended to determine the association between the 
independent variable tax revenue per capita and the dependent variable aggregate debt 
(AggDebt) at the .05 level of confidence and n = 6.  A simple regression model was 
chosen in light of the sample size which, due to time constraints, was insufficient for a 
more complex multivariate regression analysis.  The analysis determined that tax revenue 
per capita has a statistically significant negative correlation with aggregate debt per capita 
at the .05 level of significance, with a t value for (TaxRev) of -3.88 and p = .018.  The 
analysis produced a regression coefficient of -19.02151 for TaxRev, meaning that for 
each increase in one dollar of tax revenue per capita, the aggregate debt of the 
municipality is predicted to decrease by $19.02.  This is a significant finding confirming 
the hypothesis that tax revenue per capita has a negative correlation with aggregate debt 
per capita.  As hypothesized, it is likely that those municipalities with higher revenues per 
capita are less inclined to finance the provision of public goods through the issuance of 
debt than those with lower per capita revenues.   
To test the association between population density and aggregate debt, a similar 
regression model was constructed as follows: 
Yi = β0 + β1Xi + εi   
Where: 
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Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities 
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities 
β1 = Slope for Dens of Kentucky cities 
Xi  = Population density per square mile (Dens) for the population of Kentucky cities 
εi = Random error in Y for observation i 
This model was intended to examine the association between density and 
aggregate debt per capita at the .05 level  (95% confidence) where n = 6.  The results of 
this model confirm the likelihood of a positive correlation between the independent 
variable (Dens) and the dependent variable (AggDebt) with a Dens t-statistic of 2.77 and 
a p value of .05.  The regression coefficient for Dens in the model is 2.79309, which 
predicts that each additional person per square mile will correlate with an additional 
$2.79 of aggregate debt in the municipality.  Thus, the hypothesis that a positive 
correlation exists between population density and aggregate debt per capita in Kentucky's 
cities is confirmed by the model.  This makes logical sense, as mentioned earlier, that 
municipalities with dense populations would have a greater need for expensive 
infrastructure projects and urban programs.  However, we must take caution in 
generalizing the results shown here.  The p value is probably acceptable for this model 
but only by a tiny margin.  Moreover, such a small sample precludes us from accurate 
generalization. 
Since the two simple regression models confirmed the theories that correlations 
exist between both TaxRev and Dens and aggregate debt, a multivariate analysis was 
attempted to further evaluate the associations.  This was done with the understanding that 
n = 6 may have been too small for an effective model of this type.  Nevertheless, it was a 
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notion worth attention.  For this model  
Yi = β0 + β1Xi  + β2X2 + εi 
Where: 
 Yi = Aggregate debt per capita (AggDebt) for the population of Kentucky cities 
β0 = Slope for AggDebt for Kentucky cities 
β1 = Slope for TaxRev for Kentucky cities 
Xi  = Tax Revenue Per Capita (TaxRev) for the population of Kentucky cities 
β2 = Slope for Dens of Kentucky cities 
X2 = Population density per square mile (Dens) for the population of Kentucky cities 
εi = Random error in Y for observation i 
This model was devised to simultaneously evaluate the associations between the 
two independent variables (TaxRev and Dens) and the dependent variable aggregate debt 
per capita (AggDebt) in Kentucky's cities.  As before, this model was constructed at the 
.05 level of confidence with n = 6.  However, the results of this analysis did not support 
the model as a good fit.  The t-values for Tax Rev and Dens were low, at -1.38 and .07 
respectively.  Moreover, the p values for each variable were significantly higher in the 
combined model, at .261 for TaxRev and .947 for Dens.  For the data in this study, with a 
small sample, the multivariate regression model was not a good fit and neither 
independent variable was statistically significant.   
Analysis of Autonomous Authorities 
Even though the dichotomous variable constructed to represent the presence of 
autonomous Public Authorities or special purpose entities did not yield a positive 
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coefficient sufficient to support the hypothesis of correlation between the variable and 
aggregate debt per capita, other empirical analyses were pursued to verify the findings.  
 First, the data were subjected to a t-test for differences in the means of two 
groups.  The six municipalities in the sample were divided into two samples to represent 
two separate populations of Kentucky's cities, those with autonomous Public Authorities 
and those without.  This was a simple matter of placing those municipalities with a value 
of 0 in the Aut row of Appendix D into group one, representing those without 
autonomous Authorities, and those municipalities with a value of 1 in the Aut row of 
Appendix D into group two, representing municipalities with autonomous Authorities. 
This analysis was conducted to test for differences between the mean aggregate 
debts per capita of the two groups with the hypotheses: 
H0 : µ1 ≥ µ2 or  µ1 - µ2  ≥0 
H1 : µ1 < µ2 or  µ1 – µ2  < 0 
A one tailed test was used to test the alternative hypothesis that the mean of group 
one was less than the mean of group two, or that municipalities with autonomous Public 
Authorities will have a higher aggregate debt per capita than those without autonomous 
Authorities.  For this test, group one n = 2 and group two n = 4 with four degrees of 
freedom and assuming equal variances. 
The results of this analysis were not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis, with a 
t-statistic of -.68 and a p value for the one tailed test of .27.  This means that there is not 
sufficient evidence that the presence of autonomous Public Authorities results in an 
increase in aggregate debt per capita.  According to the data obtained in this study, there 
is no significant difference in the mean aggregate debts of municipalities with 
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autonomous Authorities and those without autonomous Authorities. 
To substantiate this conclusion, one final empirical analysis was conducted; a 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for differences between two medians.  For this analysis, the 
two groups were identical to those used in the t-test described earlier and used to test the 
hypotheses 
H0 : M1 ≥ M2 
H1 : M1 < M2 
The test was designed to determine if sufficient evidence exists that those 
municipalities with autonomous Authorities have higher median aggregate debts per 
capita than those without autonomous Authorities.  In order to perform this test, the 
observations in each group are assigned ranks based upon values of aggregate debt per 
capita with total sample size n = 6.  The analysis yielded a T1 test statistic of 5 and a Z 
test statistic of -0.93.  For the upper tail test, the critical value is 1.65 and the p value is 
.82.  Thus, we must not reject the null hypothesis.  The results of this analysis do not 
provide sufficient evidence that the median aggregate debts per capita are higher in 
municipalities with autonomous Authorities than in those without such Authorities.      
Aggregate Debt Compositions 
To further examine the use of Public Authorities in Kentucky, it is useful to take a 
closer look at the compositions of the aggregate debts in each municipality.  The 
following figures demonstrate the amount of the aggregate debt in each municipality and 
the portions of the aggregate directly issued by municipal governments (either revenue or 
general obligation) as well as those portions issued by Authorities.  The statistics were 
derived from the 2003 debt report from the Kentucky Governor's Office for local 
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development, comprehensive annual financial reports, and direct interviews with 
administrators.  The figures below demonstrate how much variation can exist in the use 
of Public Authorities from one government to another.   
Municipality  Municipal Debt Authority Debt Aggregate Debt Authority Debt/Aggregate 
Bowling Green   $81,271,903 $12,581,671 $93,853,574  13.4% 
Florence    $36,943,333 $13,873,334 $50,816,667  27.3% 
Fayette Co.  $502,885,753 $11,139,047 $514,024,800  2.1% 
Jefferson Co.  $389,639,000 $2,201,040,391 $2,590,679,391  84.9% 
Owensboro  $60,901,234 $396,110,601 $457,011,835  86.7% 
Paducah   $10,289,505 $11,056,046 $21,345,551  51.8% 
It is important to mention again at this point that these figures are not reported by 
the local governments.  You will not find these numbers anywhere on the government's 
financial reports nor will you find them on file with state offices.  The municipal 
governments report their debts on their annual financial reports and sometimes include 
Public Authorities as component units.  Other times they do not include Authorities at all.  
The Governor's Office for Local Development releases an annual report of local debt 
statistics as well.  However, like the local governments, the state report does not 
differentiate between direct municipal obligations and Public Authority obligations.  The 
report does account for public corporations according to the U.S. Census definition but 
that definition does not encompass all special purpose governments.   
For these figures, the study used the complete listing of outstanding obligations 
for each government and determined on an individual basis, according to the definition of 
Public Authorities herein, which issues were municipal and which were obligations of 
special purpose entities.  As a result of this interpretation, the exact figures are certainly 
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debatable.  However, when one considers the enormous disparity between the 
percentages of Authority debt in each municipality shown above, the point remains clear.  
There is a great deal of variation in the debt issuance of Public Authorities across the 
municipal governments of Kentucky.    
We can draw a few other conclusions from this information.  First, qualitative 
variables such as political climates, administrative preferences, and constituent 
preferences may have as much to do with the debt issuance of local governments as the 
determinants used in this study.  Not only is there a great deal of variation in the amounts 
of the aggregate debts per capita across the municipalities, but the compositions of the 
aggregates vary tremendously.  This is likely in large part a result of the individual 
preferences of the cities.  Some local governments, like in Fayette County, clearly prefer 
to more directly control the provision public services and, by extension, the issuance of 
debt.  On the other hand, Jefferson County and Owensboro seem to prefer the creation of 
separate Authorities as a means to provide services and issue debt.  In fact, this notion 
was confirmed in interviews with Fayette County administrators, who explained that 
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government simply has never relied that heavily upon 
Authorities.  The simplicity of the statement demonstrates how much precedent and 
political-administrative preferences can weigh-in on a government's decisions regarding 
service provision and financing.   
Perhaps the most apparent conclusion to be drawn from the collection of this data 
is the imperfection and lack of transparency of information in Kentucky's local 
governments.  As mentioned earlier, the single most substantial obstacle to this study was 
that information is simply not readily available.  The acquisition of the data in this study 
required a great deal of time, persistence, and most importantly, interpretation.  As a 
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result, ten different observers might derive ten different sets of figures from the financial 
information available.  The local governments in this study do not adequately, if at all, 
report the existence or activities of Public Authorities in their jurisdictions.  The debt 
levels they report in their financial reports do not reflect the total levels of publicly held 
debt in the municipalities.  In some cases, they do not even come close.   
This is not to say that the governments in this study are intentionally concealing 
debt.  It is nothing so sinister.  The fact is, each government has an accounting and 
reporting system and, while they are quite uniform, differences clearly exist with regard 
to the reporting of Public Authorities.  While this is not a catastrophic problem, it is still a 
problem.  When the activities of a group of entities that issue at least 80% of the public 
debt in a jurisdiction are not reported, there is clearly a lack of transparency and the 
public remains in the dark with regard to the activities of entities that provide some of 
their most vital public services. 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the data collected for this study offers us some insight into the 
relationship between Public Authorities and aggregate debt, as well as other factors that 
influence aggregate debt levels in Kentucky's municipalities.  First, we may conclude that 
there is a significant negative correlation between tax revenue per capita and aggregate 
debt per capita.  The data show us that increases in the former correspond to a decrease in 
the latter.  This may or may not indicate a causal relationship and further analysis would 
be necessary to substantiate such a claim.  What can be said, however, is that tax revenue 
per capita is at least in some way linked to aggregate debt in Kentucky's municipalities.  
Logically, or at least intuitively, we might conclude that governments with higher per 
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capita tax revenues might not rely as heavily on debt financing as do governments with 
lower tax revenues.  The results of the analysis support this notion.   
Another extension of this conclusion, though not as simple, may follow from the 
supposition that municipalities having higher tax revenues per capita may have so in part 
because of more affluent residents.  Supposing this, it might follow that a municipality 
with relatively affluent residents may contain private firms that provide some of the 
goods often provided by Public Authorities or other such entities that contribute to levels 
of aggregate debt.  To illustrate this notion, suppose City A is a suburb made up of 
residents with relatively high individual incomes.  This per capita income provides a 
market for the private provision of goods or services, such as health care, that might be 
publicly provided in a less affluent city.  Such public provision of goods is often 
facilitated by debt financing through vehicles other than traditional governments, which 
contribute to higher aggregate debt.   
If this is the case, tax revenue per capita may have a multifaceted correlation with 
aggregate debt.  In other words, tax revenue may be associated with aggregate debt in 
that 1) higher revenues precipitate less reliance on debt financing 2) higher tax revenues 
per capita often result from higher per capita incomes and these incomes produce markets 
in which the private provision of goods reduce the reliance upon public provision, in 
effect reducing the need for projects requiring debt financing.  Such extensions to the 
association between tax revenue and aggregate debt may be numerous and are well 
beyond the scope of this study.  This is just an illustration demonstrating that the data 
support the theory that tax revenue per capita is negatively correlated with aggregate debt 
in Kentucky's cities but that further analysis would be necessary to determine whether or 
not this relationship is causal.   
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The practical conclusions here are logical enough and likely apply to the 
population of Kentucky's municipalities.  As high per capita aggregate debt is never 
desirable, although sometimes a necessary consequence of public/social improvements, 
Kentucky's municipalities should consider the idea that tax revenue is tied to aggregate in 
several ways.  It seems commonsensical to postulate that increasing tax revenue will 
reduce the reliance upon debt financing.  However, municipalities might find that 
exploration of the association between tax revenue and aggregate debt would yield more 
complex conclusions that may aid them in understanding the nature and causes of 
accelerated aggregate debt. 
In addition to substantiating tax revenue per capita as a determinant of aggregate 
debt per capita, the data support the theory, although to a lesser extent, that population 
density is positively correlated to aggregate debt.  Although the data do not provide as 
strong or statistically significant evidence of this correlation as for that correlation 
between tax revenue and debt, some correlation is evident and precedent compliments 
and bolsters the findings.  Other studies have identified population density as an effective 
determinant of municipal debt and, by extension, aggregate debt.  The analysis of the data 
here tends to support prior findings.  Though marginally so, the results of the model 
examining the correlation between density and aggregate debt are statistically significant.  
Even though the results of the analysis are not as powerful as one might expect, likely 
due in some part to the aforementioned problem of the sample size in a regression 
analysis, when combined with what we have learned from other studies about the 
association density and debt, it is likely that these results can be applied to the population 
of Kentucky municipalities.  Again, this may be presumptuous, based upon the sample 
size, but when one considers the precedent of density as a determinant of debt and the 
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logical sense of the argument, I am prepared to stipulate that this also applies in 
Kentucky. 
As with the findings regarding the previous variable, the practical implications of 
these results focus primarily on understanding aggregate debt.  It may be useful for a 
municipality and its constituents to understand that population density is positively 
correlated with aggregate debt and view its own levels of outstanding debt in that context.  
For example, when evaluating the financial management of a municipal government, it 
may be useful to remember that research suggests that high density areas incur more debt 
than sparsely populated ones.  This is not to say that densely populated areas cannot 
avoid accelerated debt issuance.  In fact, the very understanding of this trend may help 
governments examine what activities, programs, or entities are contributing to high or 
undesirable levels of aggregate debt and determine how to curtail the rate of issuance.  A 
municipality cannot likely control what it does not understand, especially in a case like 
aggregate debt, where issuance is decentralized and obligation is ambiguous.  
Understanding the factors that affect or seem to affect aggregate debt, like population 
density, is instrumental in monitoring and controlling issuance. 
The hypothesized determinant of aggregate debt of principal interest to this study 
is the presence of autonomous Public Authorities or special purpose entities.  The main 
goal of this study was to address the role of Public Authorities or special purpose entities 
in determining the aggregate debt of a municipality.  Specifically, this study was aimed at 
determining whether the use of autonomous Public Authorities seemed to lead to 
increased levels of aggregate debt.  Early on, this study discussed the two sides of the 
argument over the use of Public Authorities.  Those who support Authorities as purveyors 
of goods argue that their independence and expertise make them ideal for certain 
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missions.  Critics argue that Authorities are primarily vehicles used to circumvent debt 
limitations and that they can be subject to mismanagement, especially financially, in 
which case their autonomy may lead to undesirable levels of debt issuance.  The primary 
goal of this study was to determine if evidence exists to support the theory that 
Authorities with great degrees of autonomy take advantage of this freedom to issue more 
debt.  The logic here is that, if relatively autonomous Authorities are issuing larger 
volumes of debt in Kentucky's municipalities, the aggregate debts per capita of 
municipalities with autonomous Authorities would generally exceed those of their 
counterparts who tightly control the activities of their Authorities.  In short, this study 
attempted to discern whether those Authorities with the freedom to issue debt with 
relative impunity are doing so in Kentucky's cities and, by extension, endangering the 
financial positions of their creator governments. 
In order to accomplish this task, this study included several test to examine the 
relationship between the presence of autonomous Authorities and aggregate debt per 
capita.  First, Public Authorities were identified and categorized and those municipalities 
granting autonomy to its Authorities, per Appendix C, were identified.  According to the 
data obtained four of the six municipalities sampled utilized autonomous Authorities and 
two did not.  Upon first analysis, there appeared to be little relationship between the 
presence of such Authorities and aggregate debt.  There was no immediately evident 
trend demonstrating higher aggregate debts per capita in those municipalities with 
autonomous Authorities than those without.   
To test the correlation between the presence of autonomous Authorities and 
aggregate debt, the correlation coefficients were determined.  This method produced no 
evidence of correlation between the variables and thus, we could not conclude that any 
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association exists between the two.  To further examine the possibility of association, a t-
test was performed to determine if the presence of autonomous Authorities correlates 
with a difference in the average levels of aggregate debt per capita in the municipalities.  
As before, there was no evidence suggesting that such a relationship exists.  Finally, the 
same data were subjected to a Wilcoxon rank sum test to search for evidence that 
municipalities with the Authorities were incurring higher levels of aggregate debt per 
capita than those without such Authorities.  Again, no evidence of significance was found 
to support this theory. 
Despite a few drawbacks, these analyses tell us a few important things about 
Public Authorities and aggregate debt.  First, there is no evidence in the data that 
autonomous Authorities, as defined by this study, are leading to increased debt issuance 
in Kentucky's cities.  If the data are accurate and generally representative of Kentucky's 
municipalities, this seems to support the proponents of Public Authorities.  At the very 
least, the study supports proponents of Authorities by default, in that it provides no 
evidence that their use is leading to increased debt issuance.  This does not conclusively 
mean that Authorities with relatively high degrees of autonomy are harmless or that 
critics of Authorities are unfounded.  Critics of Authorities can always argue the potential 
for financial mismanagement.  However, this study does not provide critics any 
ammunition for their assault on Authorities.  In other words, autonomous Authorities, by 
their definition, have the potential to issue undesirable amounts of debt and thus affect 
the financial position of their creator governments.  According to the data collected from 
Kentucky's municipalities, however, they do not appear to be doing so. 
Public Authorities or special purpose entities are sometimes used to avoid the 
direct obligation of debt or circumvent debt limitations and some scholars have 
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concluded that they are largely created for financial rather than administrative motives. 
(Leigland, 1994) However, there is no evidence here that those municipalities granting 
high degrees of freedom to their Authorities are incurring higher levels of aggregate debt.  
It is quite possible that the disparities in the levels of aggregate debt are the result 
of several variables that can be measured, such as tax revenue and population density, 
and several variables that cannot be quantified.  It is likely that one of the most important 
determinants of aggregate debt falls into the latter category.  Some municipalities, such as 
Paducah, simply choose to avoid debt as part of their standard procedures or political 
choices.  On the other hand, cities such as Owensboro are apparently much more 
comfortable with large amounts of Authority debt.  It is worthwhile to note again that in 
cases such as Owensboro, the city does not have an abnormally high amount of general 
obligation debt outstanding.  (See Appendix D)  It just has a large amount of revenue and 
Authority debt.  This demonstrates that some cities, while they may not be dangerously 
encumbering future revenue with general obligation debt service, are not bashful about 
the use of revenue debt, particularly when using Authorities as a vehicle.  In other words, 
it is probable that much of the difference between the levels of aggregate debt in the 
municipalities results from debt-averse political climates and matters of constituent 
preference.  
While there are numerous limitations to this study, as discussed earlier, it does 
demonstrate a lack of correlation between autonomous Authorities and aggregate debt.  
Moreover, it confirmed two possible determinants of aggregate debt in tax revenue, with 
a negative correlation and population density, with a positive correlation.  With respect to 
the use of Public Authorities, there is no evidence here that Kentucky's municipalities 
need to take any new measures to control debt issuance.  It seems that the controls and 
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limitations built into the charters of Authorities, even those with relative freedom of 
financial management, combined perhaps with the professionalism of directors and 
leaders is containing debt issuance. 
In order to further examine the relationships between these variables and perhaps 
verify the findings of this study, it would be necessary to first expand the sample size of 
municipalities to make the analysis more generalizable.  If this was done, we could 
further explore the subject matter of this study with a multivariate regression model to 
examine the hypothesized determinants of aggregate debt.  If time and resource 
constraints permitted, a regression model with a larger sample might substantiate the 
results of this study.  Perhaps the model 
Y = I + b1X1 + b2X2 + b3X3 + b4X4+ E 
Where: 
Y = Aggregate Debt per Capita  
I = Intercept 
X1 = Population Density (per square mile) 
X2 = Tax Revenue Per Capita  
X3 = Intergovernmental Revenue as a Percentage of Total Revenue  
X4 = Presence of Autonomous Authorities (Dichotomous Variable) 
E = Standard Error    
or something of the like might provide us with a better understanding of the association 
between Public Authorities, as well as other hypothesized determinants, and aggregate 
debt.   
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One of the most important conclusions reached in this study concerns the 
information regarding Public Authorities in Kentucky.  It seems that these entities exist in 
relative obscurity among the population of the Commonwealth's governmental bodies.  
Creator governments in far too many cases have little knowledge or understanding of the 
specific activities of Authorities.  Even if control is relinquished considerably to 
Authorities, it may be wise to maintain some degree of surveillance.  This would allow 
for two desirable results.  First, if the creator government is explicitly aware of the 
activities of its Authorities, it may be able to discourage or correct activities it deems 
detrimental to its own financial position.  Moreover, if it maintains awareness of the 
activities of its Authorities, it may be able to learn from these activities and refine its 
future use of special purpose entities.   
The second main advantage of maintaining at least some level of surveillance 
over Authorities is to provide for better transparency for constituents.  Authorities 
provide some of the most visible services to residents, yet the nature of their 
administrative and financial activities remains obscured from public view.  There are no 
repositories for this information and its location and collection is tedious.  As result, 
constituents in a democratic process often have little knowledge of the activities of 
governmental entities that provide some of their most vital services. 
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